In the domestic chip industry, the era of "survivors reign supreme" has passed; now, it is a time where "only the winners reign supreme."

After nearly six years in the chip entrepreneurship, I engage in deep contemplation at each milestone.

Throughout these years, I have written numerous articles and also reviewed and summarized them. Objectively speaking, the articles I have written have stood the test of time. In writing, I am not accountable to anyone but myself and the chip industry I am involved in and have founded.

Every entrepreneur is a child of their times, catering to the era and fulfilling its demands. By leveraging their abilities and efforts, they seize the opportunities of the era.

Chip entrepreneurship is no different; it is the era that has granted us an opportunity. I have also hypothesized that if it were the same team with the same funding, and if our current product had come out three years ago, the situation would be entirely different. At different points in time, the competitive landscape of the market varies, and so do the opportunities.

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Opportunities are cyclical and also contain elements of randomness. Once, photovoltaics were high-tech and highly representative in China. I found a timeline of significant events in China's photovoltaic industry online:

2001: The germination of China's photovoltaic industry.

2003-2007: Driven by the European and American markets, the global photovoltaic market experienced its first boom, and Chinese photovoltaics went global.

2008: The global financial crisis triggered the first photovoltaic industry downturn.

2009-2011: National subsidies helped the industry overcome difficulties.2012: Western "double anti-dumping" sanctions, the darkest moment for China's photovoltaic industry, and the second photovoltaic industry recession.

2012-2017: The state promotes subsidies per kilowatt-hour, entering the subsidy-driven era. At the same time, the monocrystalline route rises, and thin-film batteries gradually exit.

2018: The "531" new policy reduces subsidies, leading to the third photovoltaic industry recession.

2019: Monocrystalline silicon PERC technology dominates the market.

2020: China's photovoltaic power generation achieves grid parity, entering a market-driven era. At the same time, the "dual carbon" goal is proposed, and the photovoltaic industry is on the verge of a comprehensive explosion.

2023: The first year of large-scale mass production of N-type batteries replacing the original ones.

Overcapacity in the main material links of the photovoltaic industry chain in 2023

It can be seen that the rise and recession of an industry roughly take about 10 years, with technology as the concept, market as the driver, capital as the empowerment, and finally ending with overcapacity.

Old science and technology are easy to become surplus, while new science and technology are not so easy to emerge. In the field of chips, if it is not advanced process technology, if it is not advanced design and packaging, if it is not special process technology, China will basically achieve the domestication of chips. Domestic chips are also entering a surplus stage. What can be done in these years will be done, and what cannot be done will not be done in a short time.

Many people have exaggerated the scale of China's chip market, counting the import amount of chips needed for contract manufacturing of Apple's mobile phones and other products as their own market scale, which is actually irrelevant to us. If we cannot integrate into the global electronic market, the scale of China's chip market will at most account for one-third of the global market. With the rise of India's electronic market, the proportion of China's chip market scale will decrease further.In summary, China's electronics market cannot accommodate so many domestic chip companies, especially considering that the chip industry is one that continuously consolidates towards the top players. Therefore, the future of China's chip industry will develop towards two extremes: either companies grow large or they remain small, with no middle ground.

Companies aiming to grow large will become platform-based, while those aiming to stay small will focus on differentiation. Platform-based companies are essentially public companies, whereas smaller chip design companies are typically private enterprises or partnerships of a few individuals, which do not participate in financing.

Thus, the ultimate fate for this wave of domestic chip startups is limited to two outcomes: going public or being acquired (excluding chip companies that have not engaged in financing). It can also be inferred that within five years, more than 90% of the existing 3,000-plus chip design companies will vanish.

The above conclusion is based on the premise that the path of continued financing to allow previous investors to exit is now blocked; the options are either to go public or to be acquired, with no third way available.

As a chip entrepreneur, one must contemplate whether the company should continue to seek financing. If financing is pursued, one must consider the path to going public and the timing of the IPO; if the IPO timing is not visible, one must consider whether subsequent investors are willing to take over old shares to allow early investors to exit; if early investors have no opportunity to exit, the issues between founders and investors cannot be properly resolved, and the startup will struggle to continue. If neither going public nor allowing early investors to exit is possible, what is the purpose of continuing to raise funds? It will only burden the founder with more debt.

In the past, some companies, in pursuit of going public, did not focus on economic viability, nor on the balance of investment and output, and even adopted the internet's money-burning model to subsidize the market. Once unable to go public, these become sunk costs, for which no one will pay except the entrepreneurs and investors. If considering acquisition, one must make their company and products valuable, ensuring that capital is preserved and increased during investment. Do not engage in chip development that does not bring value, and do not hire personnel who do not make the company more valuable.

This year, I constantly remind myself not to engage in the development of repetitive and highly competitive chip products, nor those without performance and cost competitiveness. I also cut away sales resources invested without profit, solely for the sake of sales volume.

Finally, to reiterate my personal viewpoint: In the domestic chip industry, the era of the survivor being the king is over; only the victor shall reign.